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How is it possible to drive home and have no awareness of the trip? We documented a
new form of inattentional blindness in which people fail to become aware of obstacles
that had guided their behavior. In our ﬁrst study, we found that people talking on cell
phones while walking waited longer to avoid an obstacle and were less likely to be aware
that they had avoided an obstacle than other individual walkers. In our second study, cell
phone talkers and texters were less likely to show awareness of money on a tree over the
pathway theywere traversing. Nonetheless, theymanaged to avoidwalking into themoney
tree. Perceptual information may be processed in two distinct pathways – one guiding
behavior and the other leading to awareness. We observed that people can appropriately
use information to guide behavior without awareness.
Keywords: inattentional blindness, cell phone, attention, visual attention, perception-action dissociation, ventral
and dorsal visual streams, two visual systems hypothesis
INTRODUCTION
How is it possible to safely drive home, yet have little awareness
of the trip? This common experience occurs during driving and
walking – people can arrive at their location with little aware-
ness of the trip and no memory for objects passed along the way.
In some cases, people may arrive at a typical target location but
fail to stop at an intended location – you may ﬁnd yourself at
home having failed to stop at the grocery store on the way as
you intended. In other words, people appear able to drive and
walk without complete awareness of performing the navigation
task.
There are two broad categories of possible explanations. One
possible explanation is that people were aware of the road and
obstacles during the drive, but immediately forgot those features.
Alternatively, driving without awareness may represent a form
of inattentional blindness, in which objects that pass through
the focal point of vision do not enter awareness (Neisser and
Becklen, 1975; Becklen and Cervone, 1983; Mack and Rock, 1998;
Simons and Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000). People may use visual
information to guide the control of actions, but may not devote
attention to objects. Without attention, people may fail to bind
features into objects (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 2007)
and thus may fail to become aware of the things they pass when
driving or walking. This second possible explanation would be
consistent with the theoretical claim that visual information fol-
lows two pathways after low level visual processing (Goodale
and Milner, 1992; Jeannerod and Jacob, 2005; Westwood and
Goodale, 2011). One pathway is the dorsal pathway which uses
visual information to guide action, enabling someone to grab
an object or navigate around obstacles. The other pathway is
the ventral pathway leading to object recognition and conscious
awareness.
Inattentional blindness has been demonstrated in lab stud-
ies and naturalistic observations. In lab studies of inattentional
blindness, people attend to one aspect of a complex event (count-
ing basketball passes by one of two teams) and fail to notice an
unusual event that occurs directly in front of their eyes, such as
a gorilla or a woman carrying an umbrella (Neisser and Becklen,
1975; Becklen and Cervone, 1983; Mack and Rock, 1998; Simons
and Chabris, 1999). Inattentional blindness also occurs in natural-
istic settings causedby cell phone conversations duringdriving and
walking (Strayer et al.,2003; Strayer andDrews,2007;Hymanet al.,
2010). In driving simulators, cell phone use leads to decreased
recognition of objects that individuals drove past, even though
they were just as likely to have looked at the objects (Strayer et al.,
2003). People will fail to notice a unicycling clown when talking
on a cell phone while walking (Hyman et al., 2010) and a ﬁght
when running and tracking another person (Chabris et al., 2011).
Inattentional blindness occurs because divided attention in a com-
plex environment decreases awareness of objects that are not the
focus of attention. In each of these instances of inattentional blind-
ness, the objects that people failed to notice were interesting and
surprising, but were not directly related to the person’s primary
task.
Cell phone use not only disrupts awareness in a divided atten-
tion situation, but also impacts the control of behavior. People
using a cell phone walk more slowly, weave, and change direc-
tions more often than people who are not using their cell phones
(Hyman et al., 2010), display less safe behavior crossing a street
(Neider et al., 2010; Schwebel et al., 2012; Nasar and Troyer, 2013)
and experience difﬁculties using visual information to guide the
control of walking through doorways (Lopresti-Goodman et al.,
2012). In driving simulators, people using cell phones also display
more difﬁculties controlling the car and responding to changes
in the environment (Strayer et al., 2003, 2006; Rakauskas et al.,
2004; Kubuse et al., 2006; Törnros and Bolling, 2006; Horrey and
Simons, 2007; Drews et al., 2008; Bellinger et al., 2009). Clearly,
cell phone use and divided attention disrupts both awareness of
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the world (the ventral pathway) and the control of behavior (the
dorsal pathway).
Nonetheless, we suspect that divided attention may cause
greater disruptions to awareness than control of behavior. Even
without complete awareness of objects and the environmental lay-
out, peoplemay be able to use visual information to guidewalking:
people may move to avoid an object without recognizing what
the object is. Several lines of evidence are consistent with this
possibility.
One line of evidence consistent with a difference between
awareness and behavior control comes from differences in per-
ception of slopes and physical responses to slopes. Profﬁtt et al.
(1995) have found that when people provide verbal estimates of
the slope of a hill they tend to overestimate that slope. The size of
the overestimating error is related to a variety of factors. People
estimate the slope is steeper from the top than from the bottom,
after a run, and when wearing a heavy backpack (Profﬁtt et al.,
1995; Bhalla and Profﬁtt, 1999). Nonetheless when people use
their hands to directly match the slope of the hill, they accurately
create the correct slope. Profﬁtt (2013) argued that there is a dis-
sociation between awareness and bodily control, a claim that has
been questioned by other researchers (Durgin et al., 2009, 2012;
Firestone, 2013).
Similar dissociations between awareness and action have been
found with visual illusions. People visually perceive lines as differ-
ent in length in the Müller-Lyer and circles as different in size in
the Ebbinghaus illusion. Even when someone understands these
illusions, that person will nonetheless see the lines and circles as
different sizes. But in versions of the illusions that allow people
to perform actions, they do not consistently display the illusions
in their behaviors. For example, people see the illusory length
difference in the Müller-Lyer illusion, but nonetheless point accu-
rately and walk the correct distance when blindfolded (Wraga
et al., 2000; Bruno et al., 2008). Similarly people will accurately
set their grasp to allow them to pick up the center circle in the
Ebbinghaus illusion (Aglioti et al., 1995; Lee and van Donke-
laar, 2002; Culham et al., 2003) and other illusions (Bruno and
Bernardis, 2002). Research on dissociations between action and
awareness in visual illusions has been criticized because grasping
is inﬂuenced by visual illusions in many situations (Franz et al.,
2000; Franz, 2001; Bruno and Franz, 2009; Schenk et al., 2011).
Thus Bruno and Franz (2009) argued that this line of research
does not provide compelling evidence for the two visual systems
hypothesis.
A more direct dissociation between action and awareness has
recently been reported in a visual search task (Solman et al., 2012).
Participants were presented with a pile of different shapes on a
computer screen and were asked to move the objects to ﬁnd a
particular one. People frequently moved the target without rec-
ognizing it as the target. Thus they used visual information to
direct behavior without necessarily becoming consciously aware
of which object they moved. Usually participants became aware of
the target object directly after missing it, but on a small number
of trials they moved the target and did not return to the target for
several moves.
Navigating in a complex real world environment may some-
times involve behavior being guided by objects that are not
consciously recognized. For example, Yanko and Spalek (2014)
found that people sometimes lose awareness while driving in a
simulator. When probed, participants acknowledged occasions of
mind-wandering; that is thinking about something other than the
task of driving (see alsoHe et al., 2011). Mind-wanderingwas asso-
ciated with changes in driving including faster speed and slower
responses to braking events. Individuals were more likely to drive
without awareness on routes they had driven more frequently than
on novel routes (Yanko and Spalek, 2013).
Becoming aware of an object is generally assumed to require
focused attention. People must allocate some attention to bind a
set of features to a location (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). Without
attention, objects may nonetheless inﬂuence a person and guide
behavior. If attention is more important for object recognition
than directing behavior, then divided attention should be more
disruptive of awareness than accurate navigation. Thus cell phone
use while walking leads to inattentional blindness for interest-
ing objects near an individual’s path (Hyman et al., 2010). Other
forms of distraction and divided attention also lead to inatten-
tional blindness (Chabris et al., 2011) and to mistaken judgments
of walking distance (Sargent et al., 2013). In spite of lapses of
awareness in these studies, people successfully navigated through
complex environments.
In the standard demonstrations of inattentional blindness, peo-
ple fail to become aware of objects unrelated to their current task.
We were interested in something more directly related to the phe-
nomenon of driving and walking without awareness: can people
experience inattentional blindness for obstacles that nonetheless
guided behavior? We conducted two studies in which we placed
obstacles directly in the pathway of walkers and checked if they
avoided the obstacles and if they became aware of the obsta-
cles. In essence, our argument is that visual information can
be used to guide behaviors but that object recognition is pro-
cessed separately and is dependent on attention (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980; Goodale and Milner, 1992; Jeannerod and Jacob,
2005; Wolfe, 2007; Westwood and Goodale, 2011). Since cell
phones may use attentional resources needed for object recog-
nition, we looked at people walking with and without using
cell phones. We predicted that even without using cell phones
people would sometimes fail to become aware of the obsta-
cles they avoid. In part this should occur because we placed
our obstacles in a familiar pathway and this is a situation that
should lead to mind-wandering and reduced awareness (Yanko
and Spalek, 2013). We also predicted that individuals using their
cell phones would be less likely to become aware of the obsta-
cle because this should disrupt the use of focused attention
needed for object recognition (Strayer et al., 2003; Hyman et al.,
2010).
STUDY 1
METHODS
Participants
Weobserved individuals passing a signboardon a campuspathway.
Observers rotated through three categories of individual walkers:
52 individuals with no electronics in use, 46 individuals listen-
ing to personal music players, and 43 individuals talking on a
cell phone. If the observer went more than ﬁve minutes without
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being able to observe a person in the next category, the observer
skipped to the following category. Observations were collected of
141 individuals (observers classiﬁed 75 as female, 62 as male, and
4 unsure; 124 were classiﬁed as college-aged, 11 as older, and 6
unsure).
Procedure
We placed a signboard on a pathway and observed when people
moved to avoid the sign. The sign was placed at a point where
people tend to stay near the edge of the path because the path
curves to right approximately 30 feet beyond the placement. The
signboard stated“PsychologyResearch inProgress”. Discreet stakes
were placed in the planting area beside the pathway at a distance of
5 and 10 feet before the signboard. Using the stakes, the observers
noted at what point the walkers moved to avoid the signboard. The
observers worked in pairs and were stationed across the pathway,
near the entrance of a building. After each walker passed the sign-
board, the observers approached to ask a few questions. All walkers
were approached 15 feet after passing the signboard such that their
backs remained to the signboard. The observers ﬁrst obtained per-
mission to ask the walker a few questions. If the walker agreed,
then the observer asked if they had passed any obstacles on the
pathway. If the walker believed they had, then they were asked to
identify the obstacle. If they did not volunteer the signboard as
the obstacle, they were asked if they had passed a signboard and
if they knew what was on the signboard (claiming anything about
psychological research was counted as correct and no one said
either psychology or research without the other term). Thus we
collected both a behavioral measure (when they moved to avoid
the signboard) and a perceptual awareness measure (awareness
of what obstacle was avoided). Observers worked during normal
class periods over a two week period when their schedules and
weather permitted. We collected data until we obtained at least
40 observations in each condition (based on other similar stud-
ies in our lab we anticipated this would provide adequate power,
Hyman et al., 2010).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Cell phone use disrupted both control of behavior and awareness
of the obstacle. In our results, we grouped individuals with-
out electronics and those listening to music players. We planned
throughout the study to combine these groups because we did not
anticipate any differences based on previous research (Strayer and
Johnston, 2001; Consiglio et al., 2003; Hyman et al., 2010; Neider
et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2012). Preliminary analyses also indi-
cated no differences between individuals with music players and
individuals without any electronics.
People walking while talking on their cell phones were more
likely to wait until they were within 5 feet of the signboard before
changing their path to avoid the signboard than were individuals
and people listening to music players [χ2 (1, N = 141) = 5.58,
p = 0.018]. Although most individuals moved early to avoid
the signboard, 25.82% of the cell phone users waited until they
were within ﬁve feet whereas only 10.20% of non-cell phone
users waited until within ﬁve feet. This ﬁnding is consistent
with other research ﬁndings showing that cell phone users dis-
play difﬁculty with behavioral control when walking (Consiglio
et al., 2003; Nasar et al., 2008; Bellinger et al., 2009; Hyman et al.,
2010) and when driving in a simulator (Strayer and Johnston,
2001; Strayer et al., 2003). Table 1 presents the outcome measures
grouped by cell phone users, music player users, and individuals
without electronics. This provides additional information show-
ing that cell phone users typically perform differently than other
walkers.
When approached by the researchers, cell phone users were
less likely to agree to respond to questions than were other walk-
ers [χ2 (1, N = 141) = 18.14, p < 0.001]. Only 62.79% of cell
phone users agreed to respond whereas 91.84% of other walk-
ers agree to participate. This may, of course, limit the accuracy
of the awareness data for cell phone users. Most likely the cell
phone users who refused to answer questions were those most
engaged in their phone conversations. This would imply that they
were less aware of their environment since cell phone conversa-
tions lead to inattentional blindness. In other words, while losing
cell phone users was a problem, we may have lost individuals less
aware of their surroundings, working against the pattern of the
ﬁndings.
We then checked if the walkers were aware that they had walked
past a signboard. Consistent with inattentional blindness, cell
phone users were less likely to be aware that they had passed a
signboard [χ2 (1, N = 117) = 5.13, p = 0.024]. While 83.33% of
individuals without electronics and individuals listening to music
were aware that they had passed a signboard, only 62.96% of cell
phone users were aware. When asked if they knew what was on
the signboard, the difference between cell phone users (55.56%)
and other walkers remained [77.78%; χ2 (1, N = 117) = 5.16,
p = 0.023].
We next investigated whether when people moved was related
to the awareness of the obstacle. We did not have a clear set of
predictions here. One possibility is that moving late (within 5
feet of the signboard) would reﬂect a lack of awareness of one’s
surroundings. We might expect people who moved late to display
less awareness; that is more inattentional blindness. On the other
hand, people who moved late may have suddenly become aware of
the signboard and changed their walking direction in response to
this last minute awareness. Thus late movers may have been more
aware than early movers. Overall people who waited to move were
less likely to be aware of the signboard [χ2 (1, N = 117) = 4.65,
p = 0.031]. For people who moved early, 82.00% were aware of
the signboard but only 58.82% of people who moved within 5 feet
were aware of the signboard.
Table 1 | Measures of behavior and awareness based on cell phone
use in Study 1: the signboard.
Walking condition
Cell phone Music player No electronics
Moved within 5 feet 25.8% (11/43) 10.9% (5/46) 9.6% (5/52)
Answered questions 62.8% (27/43) 95.7% (44/46) 88.5% (46/52)
Saw signboard 63.0% (17/27) 77.3% (34/44) 89.1% (41/46)
Knew content 55.6% (15/27) 72.7% (32/44) 82.6% (38/46)
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Aswehave alreadynoted,whenpeoplemovedwas related to cell
phone use. Therefore we conducted this analysis separately for cell
phone users and other individuals. For cell phone users, moving
early or late was unrelated to awareness of the signboard [χ2 (1,
N = 27) = 0.001, p = 0.974]. No matter when they moved, only
63% of cell phone users were aware of the signboard. For non-cell
phone walkers, people who moved within 5 feet (55.56%) were
less aware of the signboard than people who moved before 5 feet
[86.42%; χ2 (1, N = 90)= 5.56, p = 0.018].
Both control of walking and awareness of obstacles were inﬂu-
enced by cell phone use. Cell phone users moved to avoid an
obstacle later and were less aware of the obstacle a few moments
later than were other walkers. Importantly, people did not walk
into the signboard. But for many individuals avoiding the obsta-
cle did not lead to awareness of the obstacle. This is a real world
demonstration of walking without awareness. The observation
that people who moved to avoid the obstacle at the last moment
were actually less likely to be aware of the object is important
for this phenomenon. To some extent, we might have antici-
pated these individuals would become suddenly aware as they
noticed and responded within 5 feet. Instead the visual informa-
tion was sufﬁcient to guide behavior without leading to conscious
awareness. This is possibly a demonstration of a dissociation of
behavior control and awareness. Such a dissociation is consistent
with the claim that there are two pathways for visual information
leading to behavior control and awareness (Goodale and Mil-
ner, 1992; Jeannerod and Jacob, 2005; Westwood and Goodale,
2011). This ﬁnding is also consistent with other instances in which
awareness and body responses are inconsistent and appear some-
what dissociated (Aglioti et al., 1995; Wraga et al., 2000; Bruno
and Bernardis, 2002; Profﬁtt, 2006; Bruno et al., 2008; Solman
et al., 2012). Nonetheless, it is possible that participants were
aware of the signboard but quickly forgot the object as they
moved past the object. This interpretation would be consistent
with criticisms of the two visual systems hypothesis (e.g., Bruno
and Franz, 2009). For this reason, in our second study we used
an unusual stimulus that we expected would result in distinct
behaviors if walkers became aware of the stimulus – money on
a tree.
STUDY 2
This study was inspired by “The Money Tree,” a YouTube video
in which Rosenthal (2010) placed 100 one-dollar bills on a tree.
Although she was interested in watching the excited responses as
people discovered the money, she observed that people generally
failed to become aware of the money, even after avoiding the tree
while walking and often after looking directly at the tree. With her
permission, we examined her original 1 h recording from which
theYouTube videowas edited. Consistent with her claim,we found
that few people became aware of the money. We judged awareness
as stopping to examine or take the money. We recreated the money
tree as an observational study.
METHODS
Participants
On several narrow pathways, we observed people as they passed
money hanging on a branch over the path. Observations were
collected of each individual who passed the money tree. If some-
one else was stopped to examine the money as an individual went
by, we did not collect observations of the additional person since
social interaction added an additional uncontrolled aspect to the
situation. We observed 396 individuals (observers classiﬁed 193 as
female and 203 as male; 375 were classiﬁed as college-aged and 21
as older). Most individuals were not using any electronic devices
(268 individuals), 65 were using music players, 33 were talking on
their cell phones, and 30 were texting.
Procedure
Three-dollar bills were clipped onto a branch of a deciduous tree
beside a narrow path. We used paths between a set of dorms and
the academic center of campus. The branch of the tree with the
money was bent so that it hung over the path at head height (see
Figure 1 for a photograph of a research assistant walking past the
money tree). Since the branch was positioned to extend down over
the path, all individuals had to move their heads in order to not
walk into the branch. Observers were positioned in pairs about 15
feet beyond the money tree in apparent conversation. Observers
FIGURE 1 | A research assistant walking past the money tree while
texting.
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collected data over a two-week period as weather and schedules
permitted. Observations were collected until at least 30 people
were observed in each category.
Because inattentional blindness can result in a failure to become
aware of objects that pass directly through the focal point of vision,
we depended on behavioral indexes of awareness. We counted
individuals as displaying awareness of the money if they stopped
to examine the money or if they took the money. Each dollar bill
had a message taped to it noting that this was part of a psychology
research project. Thus some people examined but did not take the
money.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As with Study 1, we planned to combine walkers without electron-
ics with walkers with music players because previous research has
found no differences between these conditions. We ﬁrst compared
and found no difference between cell phone talkers and texters.
Thus we collapsed across these conditions. Individuals using their
cell phones to talk or text were less likely to display clear evi-
dence of awareness of the money (6.35%; 4 of 63) than those with
no electronics or with music players (19.82%; 66 of 333). Thus
cell phone use disrupted awareness of objects that people avoided
while walking [χ2 (1, N = 396)= 6.61, p= 0.010]. Although peo-
ple rarely displayed overt awareness of the money, only 12 people
(3.0%) walked into the branch with the money. Given so few
observations, it was impossible to discern any difference based on
walking condition for walking into the tree. We did not, however,
observe any individual who walked into the tree stopping to take
the money. In this fashion we observed that people can walk past
potentially interesting objects and fail to display overt awareness
of the objects. Most individuals failed to become aware of money
on a tree.
We combined people talking and texting with a cell phone
because we found no difference between these conditions – any
use of a cell phone disrupted awareness of the money. From a
working memory perspective (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974),
texting should have been more disruptive because both texting
and recognizing objects depend on the visual-spatial sketchpad
aspect of working memory. We may have failed to ﬁnd such an
effect because of ﬂoor effects – almost no one with a cell phone
displayed awareness of the money. Another possible explanation
is that recognizing an object depends on executive control and any
cell phone use also depends on executive control. At this point we
cannot be sure if there is no difference between texting and talk-
ing or if we simply were unable to observe the difference in this
study.
DISCUSSION
In two studies we observed that people can avoid obstacles in the
walking path but nonetheless display little immediate awareness
for what the object is and no memory for the object within a few
moments of passing. Cell phone users were more likely to dis-
play this lack of awareness indicating the importance of attention
for becoming aware of and recognizing objects. Of course many
people listening to music and individuals who were not using any
electronic devices also failed to remember passing a signboard and
did not display awareness of money hanging on a tree. Failure to
become aware of one’s surroundings in these instances may rep-
resent an instance of mind-wandering while walking. The people
may have become focused on their own thoughts and been less
aware of their surroundings (He et al., 2011; Yanko and Spalek,
2013, 2014).
These naturalistic observations may be demonstrations of how
people can drive home and seemingly have little awareness while
driving and no memory for the trip after arriving home. People
can use information about an object to guide behavior without
becoming aware of what the object is – a clear dissociation between
the guidance of behavior and awareness. These studies provide
the evidence that people can experience inattentional blindness
for objects that guided behavior. This is an important exten-
sion of inattentional blindness studies, since both traditional lab
studies (Neisser and Becklen, 1975; Becklen and Cervone, 1983;
Mack and Rock, 1998; Simons and Chabris, 1999) and naturalistic
studies (Hyman et al., 2010; Chabris et al., 2011) have only demon-
strated awareness failures for objects unrelated to the ongoing task.
In another similar demonstration, Solman et al. (2012) recently
found that people can move an object during a visual search task
and not recognize that the object moved is the one for which they
were searching.
One possible explanation of these ﬁndings is that perception
may be processed in two somewhat independent pathways: the
ventral pathway leading to object recognition and the dorsal path-
way guiding behavior (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Jeannerod and
Jacob, 2005; Westwood and Goodale, 2011). To the extent that
the two pathways are somewhat independent, there should be
observable dissociations between awareness and the control of
behavior. Several lines of research have found dissociations that
are consistent with the two visual pathways hypothesis. People
differ in their perception of and behavior responses to the slopes
of hills (Profﬁtt et al., 1995; Bhalla and Profﬁtt, 1999; Profﬁtt,
2006). In addition, even when people continue to be aware of
visual illusions, the control of their walking and grasping indi-
cates accurate control to match the real rather than perceived
size of objects (Aglioti et al., 1995; Wraga et al., 2000; Bruno and
Bernardis, 2002; Bruno et al., 2008). Our studies provide natu-
ralistic observations of dissociations between awareness and the
guidance of behavior that are consistent with the two visual path-
ways hypothesis. Particularly interesting for the two pathways
argument is that even when people moved to avoid the signboard
at the last moment, this did not lead to an increased awareness of
the signboard.
The two visual systems hypothesis remains controversial.
Bruno and Franz (2009) suggested several possible versions of the
hypothesis varying in terms of the extent to which the systems are
independent. Our data do not unequivocally support any partic-
ular two pathway perspective. Instead our ﬁndings demonstrated
that people can avoid objects without complete awareness (since
they failed to respond to the money) and without awareness a few
moments later (since they were unaware they had avoided a sign-
board). We suspect that attention is more important for object
recognition and awareness than for the control of behavior. To
recognize and become aware of objects, people must use attention
to bind features to locations creating object ﬁles (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 2007). People may have been aware that there
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was an object, but without attention may not have become aware
of what the object was.
Although there is evidence that the dorsal and ventral visual
pathways lead to dissociations between awareness and the guid-
ance of movement, clearly the two systems interact in meaningful
ways (Bruno and Franz, 2009; Schenk and McIntosh, 2010). We
found that while awareness was particularly disrupted by cell
phone divided attention, divided attention also impacted the
control of behavior. People talking on their cell phones moved
later to avoid the obstacle in their pathway than other walk-
ers. This disruption of the guidance of behavior is consistent
with other ﬁndings concerning the impact of cell phones on
both walking behavior (Hyman et al., 2010; Neider et al., 2010;
Lopresti-Goodman et al., 2012; Schwebel et al., 2012; Nasar and
Troyer, 2013) and driving (Strayer et al., 2003, 2006; Rakauskas
et al., 2004; Kubuse et al., 2006; Törnros and Bolling, 2006; Horrey
and Simons, 2007; Drews et al., 2008; Bellinger et al., 2009). Peo-
ple may be able to walk and drive with little conscious awareness,
but they are not nearly as safe and competent as when aware-
ness is also involved. Divided attention makes people slower to
respond to objects. This would suggest that awareness may be
necessary to plan for movements further in advance (Bruno and
Franz, 2009). Additionally, object recognition is important for
making the appropriate response. For example, a driver needs
to respond differently to a large truck, a car, a bicyclist, and a
pedestrian. Thus awareness appears to be important for guid-
ing behavior – we should not rely on the perceptual auto-pilot
to get us safely home. These ﬁndings are important since peo-
ple continue to report wide acceptance of cell phone use during
driving and many other activities (Forgays et al., 2014). Reduc-
ing cognitive distractions, such as cell phone use, should lead to
both more awareness of one’s surroundings and better control of
behavior.
We observed inattentional blindness for avoided obstacles in
both studies. We also observed that people waited longer to
respond to the signboard, showing that divided attention disrupts
the control of behavior. While the results of these naturalistic
observations are consistent with the two visual pathways hypoth-
esis, they do not provide unimpeachable evidence. People on cell
phones may be distracted, but they nonetheless avoided both the
signboard and the money tree. Divided attention is known to dis-
rupt memory. Thus cell phone use may have disrupted holding
the awareness of the obstacles in working memory. This possibil-
ity is certainly consistent with the ﬁndings of our studies as well.
Increased forgetting from working memory is also consistent with
the general phenomenon of driving home and realizing one has
no awareness of the trip. Conceivably one could have been aware
of the drive and the obstacles during the drive. But if working
memory was occupied with other concerns, such as a cell phone
call or mind-wandering, then the information might have been
quickly lost from memory.
Our observations provide empirical examples of people walk-
ing, avoiding obstacles, and displaying little awareness of the
obstacles. People can pass a signboard and fail to be aware of
having done so within a few moments. People can walk past a
tree, move to avoid a branch, and fail to become aware of money
hanging directly in front of their faces. Apparently people may be
able to guide behavior without awareness. Inattentional blindness
for objects one avoids is a form of mindless wandering that allows
us to walk and drive without awareness of avoided obstacles.
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